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A. H. Hudson*

Declaratory Judgments
in Theoretical Cases:
The Reality of the
Dispute

I. Introduction
It has long been recognised that a declaratory judgment may have
special advantages in many contexts. Bailhache J. once went so far
as to describe the power to grant declarations as one of the most
useful functions of the Commercial Court in England, 1 and, when
the case went on appeal, Atkin L.J. described the declaration as
"'one of the most valuable contributions that the courts have made to
the commercial life of this country". 2
Despite the unqualified warmth of dicta such as these, the courts
in England and Canada have stressed that there are limits to the
availability of a declaration and one of the most important of these is
that a declaration will not normally be granted unless there is a real
and not merely an academic or theoretical dispute between the
parties. The emphasis placed on this restriction in cases where the
remedy has not otherwise been handled with any lack of liberality
seems to lend special importance to determining the factors the
courts have in mind when deciding whether a dispute is real or
unreal.
A situation in which a declaration may be of great utility, but
which raises this problem, was indicated by Channell J. in Socigtg
Maritime v. Venus SS. Co. 3 That case involved a long-running
contract to load a ship. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the
contract was not binding upon him since one of the original parties
had not acted as his agent nor had there been an effective
assignment or novation of the contract. In holding that this was a
proper case in which to grant a declaration, Channell J. said that
parties were not entitled to ask for an opinion on a speculative or
*A. H. Hudson, Professor of Law, University of Liverpool
1. Spettabile Consorzio Veneziano v. Northumberland Shipbuilding Co. (1919),
121 L.T. 628 at 629 (K.B. and C.A.)
2. Id. at 635
3. (1904), 9 Com. Cas. 289 (Q.B.) It will later be seen that if the defendant in
such a case refuses to formulate his contrary claim until a cause of action has arisen
this may deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of a declaration. See infra, notes 30-41
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academic question but, on showing the need for a declaration, they
were entitled to ask whether or not a contract was binding on them.
He stressed that they were not bound first to refuse to perform the
contract and so risk paying heavy damages for a substantial period
of non-performance.
This approach was approved by the Court of Appeal in Spettabile
Consorzio Veneziano v. NorthumberlandShipbuilding Co. 4 where a
contract was alleged to have been discharged by breach. It was held
that the issue of a writ claiming a declaration as to the validity of a
contract was not itself a repudiation of the contract when the parties
were prepared "to leave it to the court to say whether or not the
contract was to be performed". Atkin L.J., like Channell J.,
recognised that the uncertainties resulting from long-running
contracts on stringent terms had led to the rapid development of the
declaration in commercial cases.
In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co, 5 it was
held by the Court of Appeal that there was no need for a cause of
action in the ordinary sense to ground a claim for a declaration and
Lord Sumner in Russian Commercial and IndustrialBank v. British
Bank for Foreign Trade approved the Hannay case, saying that for
many years it had been the practice in cases in the Commercial List
to hear and determine claims for declarations
when a real and not a fictitious or academic question is involved
and is in being between the parties, in order that they may know
what business course to take without having to6 run the risk of
acting and finding themselves liable in damages.
It is clear then that it is of great importance in making good a
claim to a declaration that there should be a real and not a fictitious
or academic question existing between the parties. The need for a
real question applies generally 7 and is not confined to claims for a
declaration but the fact that in the case of claims for a declaration
there is no need for a cause of action in the ordinary sense has meant
that the problem has arisen more often in these claims than in other
types of case. 8
4. (1919), 121 L.T. 628
5. [1915]2K.B.536(C.A.)
6. [1921]2A.C.438at452(H.L.)
7. A. Kiralfy, The English Legal System (5th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1973) at76
8. For the reasons justifying this rule see I. Zamir, The DeclaratoryJudgment
(London: Stevens, 1962) at 50. He points out that the courts have used a wide

708 The Dalhousie Law Journal

II. The Nature of the Problem
Although so much depends on there being a real question between
the parties, it is by no means always easy to determine when such a
question exists. There is no judicially formulated general criterion
to be applied and, indeed, Sir Carleton Allen went so far as to say
that the court "has complete liberty to distinguish between a 'real'
and 'fictitious or academic' interest in the plaintiff" .9 Dr. Zamir in
his work, The DeclaratoryJudgment, considers this too pessimistic
and identifies five classes of cases which have been regarded by the
courts as "abstract" or "theoretical",o1 0 that is cases where there is
no dispute in existence, cases where the dispute is not attached to
facts, cases where the dispute is based on hypothetical facts, cases
where the dispute has ceased to be of practical significance and
cases where the declaration can be of no practical consequence. He
does, however, concede that the courts retain considerable freedom
of action. Indeed, he considers that by exception to the general rule
the courts will sometimes decide theoretical issues 11 and regards the
"friendly action", as exemplified in Thorne v. Motor Trade
Association,12 as an illustration of this.
III. Some FurtherConsiderations
It is submitted, however, that it is possible to carry analysis a little
further and produce a formula which will cover not only the five
classes of theoretical cases described by Dr. Zamir but also will not
leave "friendly actions" as a difficult anomaly. The declaratory
action is discretionary and two factors which will influence the court
in the exercise of its discretion are the utility of the remedy, if
granted, and whether, if it is granted, it will settle the questions at
issue between the parties. 13 It is doubtful if the English courts
decline to decide theoretical issues because of lack of jurisdiction or
in the exercise of their discretion 14 but, in many of the cases held to
variety of terms to describe cases where there is no real dispute - "academic",
"fictitious", hypothetical", "abstract", "theoretical" - but considers that
nothing depends on the terminology. He prefers "theoretical" as a general term.
See c.4, "Theoretical Issues" at 43-69
9. Law and Orders (2d ed. London: Stevens, 1956) at 270
10. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 50-69. See also 201-207
11. Id. at 67-68
12. [1937] A.C. 797 (H.L.)
13. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 191-99
14. Id. at 44-45 and cases there cited. In Eastham v. Newcastle United Football
Club, [1964] Ch. 413 at 440; [1963] 3 W.L.R. 574 at 594, it was said by
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be theoretical or abstract, it is clear that these two factors of utility
and conclusiveness have weighed heavily with the court. 15 Dr.
Zamir thinks that the relationship between utility as a factor in
deciding that a case is theoretical and utility as a basis for the
exercise of discretion is a question of degree. 16 If a declaration
would be wholly useless then the court will regard the case as
theoretical, whilst if it might have some but very slight utility, the
court will refuse to grant a declaration in the exercise of its
discretion. This demonstrates the close affinity between the
question of the reality of the dispute and one of the factors
governing the exercise of discretion, but the other factor, settlement
of the dispute between the parties, must also be taken into account
and with that the point of time at which the dispute would be settled
and the utility of the declaration attained.
IV. A PossibleFormula
If these are borne in mind it will be seen that a common
characteristic of the cases where the dispute was held to be unreal
appears to be that, if the declaration sought had been granted, it
could not have been immediately and effectively available to
resolve the dispute between the parties. This can be applied to the
five classes of theoretical disputes set out by Dr. Zamir. If there is
no dispute, ex hypothesi, nothing done by the court can resolve it.
Where the dispute is not embodied in specific facts any order made
by the court would not be effectively available since no one could
ascertain with any certainty the ambit of its application. Where the
Wilberforce J. that it went to discretion and the same view was expressed by
Buckley J. in Gibson v. USDAW, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1187 (Ch.D.). Both cases
concerned real disputes affected by events after the issue of the writ and in neither
is there a full review of the authorities. See, infra, note 23. For Canadian
authorities, especially Vic Restaurant v. Montreal, [1959] S.C.R. 58; 17 D.L.R.
(2d) 81 and Re Henning and City of Calgary (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 762 (Alta.
S.C., A.D.), in which the matter is regarded as going to discretion (infra, notes
69-78).
15. See e.g. Howard v. PickfordTool Co., [1951] 1 K.B. 417 at421;LeverBros.
v. Manchester Ship Canal Co. (1945), 78 L1.L.R. 507 at 509; Re Carnarvon
Harbour Acts, [1937] Ch. 72 at 80-81. See the distinction drawn between Att.
-Gen. v. Colchester Corporation, [1955] 2 Q.B. 207 and Llandudno UDC v.
Woods, [1899] 2 Ch. 705 by Zamir, supra, note 8 at 67. Conversely the fact that a
judgment would be useful to dispose of a dispute has led courts to hold that a
dispute is real in Ruislip-Northwood UDC v. Lee (1935), 145 L.T. 208 at 213,
214-15; Thorne v. MTA, [1937] A.C. 797 at 813. For Canadian cases see, infra,
notes 48-58
16. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 64
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case is hypothetical either the facts had never occurred or had yet to
occur. In neither case would the order be immediately and
effectively available since if the order were made the court would in
the first case have to say what it would have ordered had
circumstances been otherwise and in the second what would be the
solution if certain non-existent facts were to eventuate in the
future.1 7 The applicability of the formula to the remaining two
classes of theoretical disputes - cases where the dispute has ceased
to be of practical significance and cases where the declaration can
be of no practical consequence - needs no elaboration.
The formula does, however, require some expansion. A
declaration may be "immediately available" when it determines the
rights of the parties at the time of the decision together with the
necessary implications and consequences of these rights, known as
"future rights". These "future rights" are to be contrasted with
"hypothetical rights", which can only come into existence upon the
happening of some contingency which may or may not occur after
the decision and which cannot be the subject matter of a
declaration. 8 Present and future rights may, however, inplude
rights, such as a right to an option, which may require some act or
election for their full realisation but the fact that they are not fully
realised does not mean that they are non-existent or hypothetical. 19
A declaration will be "effectively available" if, when made, it
will indicate to a party a claim he may make against the other or a
claim made against him which he may either resist or to which he
should accede. If, either because of the terms on which the parties
20
are conducting their litigation, as in Sun Life of Canada v. Jervis,
17. In the first hypothesis the judgment, if made, could never be available since
there are no actual facts to which it can apply; in the second there must be a hiatus
between the judgment and the facts assumed, if they do eventuate. In neither case
could a declaration be immediately available if the court were to grant it. These
cases, where the declaration cannot in principle be immediately available, are to be
distinguished from a case where there is a real dispute and the court grants a
declaration but suspends its operation pending an appeal. Here the declaration
could have been available but for the temporary procedural step. For Canada see
Charleston v. McGregor (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 78 (Alta. S.C.); Macleod v.
White (1956), 37 M.P.R. 341 at 361 (N.B.S.C.).

18. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 201-207. For Canadian cases see infra, note 58
19. See Wood Components of London v. James Webster & Co., [1959] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 200 (Q.B.). Another example would be a tenant's right to renew a lease when
it expired. Bogg v. MidlandRlway. Co. (1867), L.R. 4 Eq. 310. For Canada seeRe
Calford (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. S.C., T.D.)
20. [1944] A.C. Ill (H.L.) See this case distinguished in Baker v. Turner,
[1950] A.C. 401 at 413, 428 (H.L.)
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where the Court of Appeal made it a condition of granting leave to
appeal to the House of Lords that the respondent should in any event
retain the benefit of the judgment in his favour in the Court of
Appeal, or because of the decision in another case, as in Tindall v.
Wright,2 1 the parties would be in exactly the same position in
respect of legal liability if the declaration were granted as if it were
not, then the dispute is theoretical or unreal. Furthermore, the words
"effectively available" cover the possibility that the party in whose
favour the decision has gone may not want to make full use of his
legal rights as determined by the courts. Nonetheless, if the
declaration can deal with these rights in such a way that he can
effectively avail of it if he wishes, the dispute will be real. This, it is
suggested, explains the "reality" of the dispute in "friendly
actions" which have often been entertained in the highest tribunals.
It also seems consonant with the dictum of Lord James of Hereford
in perhaps the best known of all "friendly actions", Powell v.
Kempton Park Racecourse. Dealing with the reality of the dispute
Lord James said:
It seems that this action was brought in good faith for the purpose
of obtaining an authoritative and final judgment. Probably the
plaintiff will regard with satisfaction his want of success in the
action. But the judgment, whatever it may be, will and must be
acted upon. This is therefore not a case where the judgment of a
judicial tribunal is sought for the purpose of determining a right
for mere abstract purposes .22
Thus if the effective character of the ultimate order of the court is
looked to, there is no need to treat "friendly actions" as anomalies
where the courts, by exception to a general rule, are prepared to
entertain unreal or theoretical disputes.
Lastly, for a dispute to be real, any order made in consequence of
it must be immediately and effectively available between the actual
parties. If it cannot be effectively available between them when it is
made, as was the case in Sun Life v. Jervis and Tindall v. Wright,
the dispute will be unreal, no matter how useful a pronouncement of
the court might be as between one of the parties and third parties not
involved in the case. In the former case, the company wished to
21. (1922), 127 L.T. 149 (K.B.)
22. [1899] A.C. 143 at 190 (H.L.) The case dealt with mandatory rules of law and
this explains the compulsive terms of the dictum. InNairne v. Smith & Co., [1943]
K.B. 17 the plaintiffs obtained an injunction by which they coud have prevented
the sale of the substances in question so that in this "friendly" case also the
judgment could have been immediately and effectively available.
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proceed with an appeal in order to obtain a ruling upon their liability
to other policyholders who might be in the same position as the
respondent and in the latter both parties wanted a decision and a
government department was interested in order to ascertain whether
new legislation might not be required. Despite this the courts
23
refused to determine the cases.
V. Policy Considerations

The reason for this requirement that the parties themselves should
be fully involved seems to be the general justification for the refusal
of the courts to entertain theoretical or unreal disputes. If the rule
were otherwise and parties without a real stake in the outcome were
allowed to litigate,then cases might not be adequately argued and
there might be a real risk of fictitious cases being put to the courts in
24
order to distort the development of precedent.
VI. Testing the Formula
The criteria proposed for determining the reality of a dispute may be
23. As to how far events after the commencement of the action affect the reality of
the dispute see Zamir, supra, note 8 at 62-64. The settlement elsewhere of the issue
of the law in Tindall v. Wright (1922), 38 T.L.R. 521 (K.B.) and the death of a
party in Marek v. Cieslak (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 663 (Ont. C.A.) were held to
render the dispute unreal. Zamir points out that Grant v. Knaresborough, [1928]
Ch. 310 should be confined to its special facts. In Gibson v. USDAW, [1968] 1
W.L.R. 1187 (Ch.D) events after the issue of the writ meant that a declaration as to
trade union suspension would be operative for only three weeks. Buckley J. held
that this did not render the dispute unreal but, even if it had, he would still have
granted a declaration in the exercise of discretion if the dispute was real when the
action was instituted. In Eastham v. Newcastle United FootballClub, [1964] Ch.
413; [1963] 3 W.L.R. 574 a declaration relating to a footballer employment
contract was granted against the employing club even though the plaintiff had left
that employment at the time of the hearing. This too was based on discretion (at
440; [1963] 3 W.L.R. at 594) but at 446 ([1963] 3 W.L.R. at 599) Wilberforce J.
also based it on the fact that there was a real dispute at the date of the writ. Counsel
for the plaintiff had taken this point at 426 and argued that what happened after the
writ only went to discretion, not jurisdiction. Though neither Gibson nor Eastham
contains a full examination of the authorities they suggest that in England, whilst
there must be a real dispute at the inception of an action, the court may exercise
discretion in respect of subsequent changes of circumstance. A special aspect of
Eastham was that the plaintiff took employment with another club which, together
with his former employers, was a member of both the Football Association and
League, other defendants in the case who were responsible for the impugned terms
of employment, so that a link was maintained with the former employers which
would not normally exist in the case of a former employee.
24. See Kiralfy, supra, note 7 at 76; Zamir, supra, note 8 at 50. But see Sellers J.
in Webster v. Commissionersof Customs and Excise, The Times, July 24, 1954.
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tested by applying them to a number of cases in which the question
25
was raised and discussed. In Thorne v. Motor Trade Association,
the association had price maintenance rules enforced by a "stop
list" and fines. There were conflicting decisions of the Court of
Appeal and the Court of Criminal Appeal on the legality of these
rules and the case, admittedly "friendly", was instituted to resolve
the conflict. Lord Wright said that he had had "some doubts" as to
whether the action was one in which relief should be granted but
went on to say that "the questions are not merely abstract, but are of
practical importance to persons in the position of the appellant" and
hence the House of Lords should not refuse to entertain the
appeal.26
Lord Wright cannot be taken to mean by this that the touchstone
of reality lay in the fact that third parties might find the decision
useful since that would conflict with Tindall v. Wright and Sun Life
v. Jervis. It would appear in fact to be an elliptic way of saying that
the parties themselves would be materially affected by the grant or
refusal of the declaration and injunction which were sought and
that, since this was a test case, others, too, would be affected.
Perhaps this last factor might be relevant to the exercise of
discretion once it had been determined that there was a real dispute.
No other member of the House mentioned the question of reality but
it is submitted that if the test suggested had been applied and the
House had asked: "If the declaration sought had been granted
would it be immediately and effectively available to resolve a
dispute between the parties?", they would have found the dispute to
be real, as in fact they impliedly did.
Dr. Zamir asserts that there was no dispute in this case. 27 This
seems to assume that a dispute must be "a quarrel or altercation".
Another meaning of the word is, however, "a controversy or
difference of opinion" 28 and it is clear that the existence of a real
dispute in the second sense may be perfectly consistent with a
friendly spirit between the parties.
Another case in which the problem of reality was explored is
Hanoman v. Rose. 29 In this appeal to the Privy Council from British
Guiana the respondent claimed a right to graze his cattle over the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

[1937] A.C. 797
Id. at813
Supra, note 8 at 68
Pocket Oxford Dictonary: "dispute"
[1955] A.C. 154 (P.C.) (British Guiana)
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whole of the appellant's adjoining land and that the appellant was
not entitled to impound these cattle. The case was fought at first
instance on the footing that the appellant was the legal owner of the
land in question. In fact, though he had paid the purchase price and
was the beneficial owner, he had not yet taken a transport (formal
conveyance) from his vendors to complete his legal title. The Board
said that there were substantial matters relating to the cattle in
dispute between the parties, sufficient to allow the action to proceed
and that they were reluctant to allow a difference between
hypothesis and reality which went to a matter of form and not of
substance, that is, the fact that the beneficial owner was also
assumed to be the legal owner, to defeat the action. In any event,
the defect could be cured by joining the appellant's vendors under
rules which were substantially the same as those in England; hence,
the West Indian courts should not have declined to hear the case.
This case seems to be authority for the proposition that a
difference between the actual and the hypothetical dispute which is
a matter of form and not of substance will not render a dispute
unreal or theoretical. This will be all the more true if the defect,
such as it is, can be cured, as by joinder of a defendant, before the
judgment, which could then be immediately effective.
VII. Has a Dispute Come into Being?
Yet another aspect of the problem of the reality of disputes arose in
Singer-Cobble v. Ellison30 where Cross J., following Re Clay, 3 1
upheld the defendant's contention that there is no jurisdiction to
make a declaratory order against a party who has never made an
assertion contrary to the declaration sought. In Re Clay, the Court of
Appeal had refused to grant a declaration against a defendant who,
when making a payment claimed by the plaintiffs, had merely
"reserved his rights" under a deed of indemnity which might
perhaps have provided an answer to the claim. The defendant had
not, however, formulated a positive claim to be repaid; hence, there
was no dispute to be settled. These and similar cases 3 2 in effect hold
30. [1966] R.P.C. 357 For Canada see PrudentialTrust Co. v. Keller (1958), 26
W.W.R. 664 (Sask. Q.B.)
31. [1919] 1 Ch. 66(C.A.)
32. E.g. In re Barnato, [1949] Ch. 21, affd [1949] Ch. 258 (C.A.); Honour v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, [1900] 1 Ch. 852; North Eastern Marine
Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co., [1906] 1 Ch. 324, affd [1906] 2 Ch. 498
(C.A.)
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that a potential dispute is not equivalent to a real dispute for the
purpose of granting a declaration, though difficult questions may
arise in distinguishing the two. It is not enough to constitute a real
dispute that steps that may be preliminary to a claim, such as an
invitation to attend an inquiry, 33 have been taken. Nor is it enough
that an opinion has been expressed that if certain hypothetical facts
were to occur a claim might be made. 34 It seems, however, that a
dispute need not be explicitly formulated in words and may be
found to exist, despite the disclaimer of one of the parties, when its
limits are plain from the facts as in Ruislip-Northwood UDC v.
Lee. 35 The question was whether some old buses and carriages
remained vehicles or had become temporary dwellings which the
plaintiff could remove. The defendant, by moving the long
immobile structures a few yards, had made it clear that he was
prepared to argue that they were still vehicles so the Court of Appeal
proceeded with the case.
The courts have made it clear that normally a potential plaintiff is
entitled to the full period of limitation in which to decide whether to
commence proceedings since this delay may be important to him to
enable him to collect evidence and prepare his case. Hence, a
potential defendant may not convert himself into a plaintiff by
seeking a declaratory judgment against a person he suspects or fears
might take action against him in the future if that person refuses to
formulate a claim against him. 3 6 The courts thus recognise that it
takes two to make a dispute and the existence of a real dispute may
depend upon whether the parties have formulated their respective
claims or whether one has refused to do so. Such a refusal may
deprive the other party of that early clarification of his legal position
which has been acclaimed as one of the commercial advantages of
the declaration. 37 Thus, in Honour v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 38 the insurance company refused to accept premiums from
33. Draperv. British OpticalAssociation,[1938]1 All E.R. 115 (Ch.D)
34. InreBarnato, [1949] Ch. 21
35. (1935), 145 L.T. 208 (K.B.)
36. See cases in note 32, especially North Eastern Marine Engineering Co. v.
Leeds Forge Co., [1906] 1 Ch. 324 at 329.
37. See Sociktd Maritime v. Venus SS. Co. (1904), 9 Com. Cas. 289; Spettabile
Consorzio Veneziano v. NorthumberlandShipbuilding Co. (1919), 121 L.T. 628.
In many cases a defendant far from objecting that a claim is premature, has
formulated his own case and the courts have proceeded. See Zamir, supra, note 8 at
213-14
38. [190011 Ch. 852
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the assignee of a life policy, alleging that the policy had originally
been obtained by fraud. When the plaintiff assignee sought a
declaration as to the validity of the policy the company objected to
the proceedings on the ground that the insured was still alive and the
assignee had no present claim against the company on the policy.
The company's objection was upheld since it might obtain further
evidence of invalidity when the insured died but it was required to
undertake that it would not raise the non-payment of premiums
against the plaintiff in any later proceedings.
Some of these points are illustrated by a case in which judicial
doubt was expressed as to the existence of a dispute. The case is
Wood Components of London v. Webster,3 9 a decision of Sellers
L.J. sitting as an additional judge of the Queen's Bench Division. A
contract for the sale of 5100 cubic feet of timber by the defendant
sellers to the plaintiff buyers provided for a sample shipment of 500
cubic feet and that acceptance of the balance should be subject to
this sample being satisfactorily received and approved by the
buyers. The buyers sought declarations that they could accept or
reject the sample at their complete discretion, that if they
disapproved the sample the contract would be at an end so far as the
balance was concerned and that if the sample was approved the
balance of the goods had to correspond with the sample shipment.
The defendants asked in their turn for declarations that the sample
could only be rejected if it failed to comply with description or some
condition or warranty, that otherwise the buyers were bound to
accept the balance and that an arbitration clause applied to the
shipment of the balance.
Sellers L.J. said that if the buyers were bound to approve the
sample provided it complied with description, condition and
warranty there was no point in referring to it as a sample. The
contract might then have been a simple sale by description of all the
timber. Hence, he held that there was a concluded contract for the
sample shipment and an option or firm offer for the balance which
was to be accepted by the buyers' approving the sample. He
therefore granted in part the declarations sought by the plaintiffs.
Sellers L.J. did, however, say that he had had some doubts as to
whether the application was premature "for it may well be, and it is
40
to be hoped that it will be, that no trouble of any kind will arise".
39. [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 200 (Q.B.)
40. Id. at 202
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Relying on the judgment of Channell J. in the Venus 4 1 case, Sellers
L.J. concluded that there was no necessity for one party to a
contract to commit an act which might amount to a breach before an
action for a declaration would lie but did not further analyse the
42
requirements of a real dispute.
There are two points for comment on this. In the first place, it
seems that the existence of a dispute which could be put to the court
for settlement was dependent on the readiness of the defendant
sellers to formulate their claims and ask in their turn for
declarations. It would have been open to them to take their stand on
cases like Honour v. Equitable Life and North Eastern Marine v.
Leeds Forge Co. 4 3 and object that it was not for the buyers to
convert themselves into plaintiffs because they feared or suspected
that they might be sued for breach if they rejected the bulk when it
complied with the contract terms. Had they wished, the sellers
might have said that they had the full period of limitation after such
an event in which to bring proceedings. Thus, the existence or
non-existence of a dispute may very well depend on the readiness of
the parties to place their claims in clear-cut form before the court.
The second point for comment is that the case seems consistent
with the general test proposed for the reality of a dispute. If the
judge had asked himself whether, if he granted the declarations
sought, they would have been immediately and effectively available
to resolve a dispute, he must have answered in the affirmative and
entertained the case, as in fact he did.
VIII. A Case to be Distinguished
A clear line must be drawn between Wood Components of London
v. Webster and another decision of Sellers J., Webster v.
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, 4" where the dispute was
held to be unreal. In the latter case, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that goods which they might later sell to the London
County Council were subject to purchase tax in order that the tender
price might be calculated. The Commissioners replied that, since
there was as yet no contract of sale, the question whether purchase
41. (1904), 9 Com Cas 289 (Q.B.)
42. [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 200 at 202-203
43. [1906] 1 Ch. 324 at 329
44. The Times, July 24, 1954 "There was no contract when the writ was issued
and the case came before the Court solely for a declaration as to what the position
per Sellers J. [emphasis added].
would have been ....
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tax applied was hypothetical, the dispute was unreal and no
declaration should be made. Whilst recognising the difficulty that
faced the plaintiffs, Sellers J. accepted this contention.
The distinction seems to be that in Webster v. Customs and
Excise the declaration, if granted, would not have been immediately
and effectively available to clarify the plaintiff's legal position.
Only if they entered into a new and independent transaction after the
granting of the declaration would it be operative on a legal situation
in which the parties were actually placed whereas in the Wood
Components case the position was very different. Though the
plaintiff might alter his legal position after the declaration had been
granted by exercising his option to take the bulk of the timber, this
would merely be working out a transaction in existence when the
declaration was granted and not the creation of a wholly new and
independent transaction. Hence the declaration could be immediately available to resolve a dispute in a sense in which it could
not be in Webster v. Customs and Excise, where of necessity there
would be some hiatus between the granting and the operation of the
declaration if it had been granted.
There may also seem to be difficulty in reconciling the refusal in
Webster v. Customs and Excise to say whether the purchase tax
would apply and the readiness of the courts in cases such as London
and Country Commercial Properties Investment Ltd. v.
Attorney-General4 5 and Pyx Granite Co. v. Ministry of Housing
and Local Government46 to say whether proposed action would
incur criminal or administrative sanctions or civil liability.
The distinction seems to be that in Webster there was no doubt as
to the legality of the contemplated contract of sale. In the second
group of cases, the question was whether the proposed action could
lawfully undertaken and not merely whether certain concomitants might or might not attach to an unquestionably legal
transaction. Hence, in the second group, the declaration if granted
would be immediately available as against the other party without
any need for the occurrence of some contingency or the entry into
some intervening transaction. Put in another way, the question in
Webster was: "What would be the consequences if the plaintiff
changed his legal position as he was clearly entitled to do?"
whereas in the other cases the question was "Could the plaintiff

-be

45. [19531 1W.L.R. 312; [1953] 1 All E.R. 436 (Ch.D)
46. [1960] A.C. 260 (H.L.). See Zamir, supra, note 8 at 174-75
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lawfully change his legal position?"
IX. The Reality of SeparateDisputes in a Case
A further point on the reality of disputes has recently been
determined by the Court of Appeal in Stott v. West Yorkshire Car
Co. 4 7 Even though the principal issue in a case may have been
settled or determined there may remain subsidiary disputes as, for
instance, between co-defendants with regard to contribution or
indemnity and these will retain their reality and should be heard by
the court. The parties to such disputes need not be put to the trouble
and expense of commencing an independent action.
Thus it seems clear that the question whether or not there is a real
dispute is one of misleading simplicity. It covers a complex of
subsidiary questions which are to be answered by the application of
a variety of tests, not all of which may be appropriate in any
particular case in which the problem of reality arises. On the other
hand, the courts have provided reasonably clear and flexible criteria
for solving the problem and these are related both to policy
considerations and to the grounds on which the courts exercise
discretion in granting or refusing declarations.
X. CanadianIllustrations
Canadian courts have also set their face against deciding
hypothetical and academic questions in granting declarations and,
whether applying a rule of law or exercising a discretion, appear to
act in this field on much the same general principles as the courts in
England, even if some of the more special applications of these
principles do not find an exact parallel in their case law. 48 It is clear,
however, that questions of utility and immediate effectiveness are
crucial in both countries.
This close resemblance is not unexpected since, as the Canadian
courts themselves have sometimes pointed out, their decisions in
this field have been based on legislation which is very similar to the
corresponding English rules and English authorities have on
49
occasion been employed.
47. [1971] 2 Q.B. 651 (C.A.), not following Calvert v. Pick, [1954] 1 W.L.R.
456 (Q.B.)
48. See cases collected in Canadian Abridgment, 2d ed., 3 Practice, Part V(4) at
62. A recent English case in which the Court of Appeal laid heavy stress on the
question of utility in granting a declaration of non-liability is Camilla Cotton Oil v.
GranadeS.A., [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 470.
49. See Hoffman v. McCloy (1917), 38 O.L.R. 446 at 450; 33 D.L.R. 526 at 529
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Thus the basic requirement that there should be a dispute between
adverse parties and that this will not be satisfied when the defendant
does not repudiate the plaintiff's interest is illustrated in the
Saskatchewan case of PrudentialTrust v. Keller. 5 0 The point that
the judgment of the court should be immediately and effectively
available between the parties can be supported from a number of
Canadian cases. In one of the more recent, the trade union case of
Charlestonv. McGregor,51 a declaration was refused on the ground
that if granted it would have been "barren of practical effect" since
the original dispute had in substance ceased to exist. In this case
considerable reliance was placed on passages from the judgment of
McNair C.J.N.B. in the slightly earlier zoning case of Macleod v.
White. 5 2 These passages contained the clear statement that the
pronouncements of the court
. . . must bind someone for the benefit of someone. It seems to
me that by their proposed declaration the plaintiffs are seeking to
elicit from the court a legal opinion not a judicial opinion with
binding effects.
A much earlier dictum to the same effect came from Harvey C.J. in
Gilmore v. Callies,53 saying that "a declaratory judgment which
the court will grant will be one under which some rights may be
established; . . . the court will not make a declaratory judgment
which is. . . entirely in the air."

Consistently with this it has been held that declaratory judgments
will not be made in respect of rights which could only come into
existence on the occurrence of some future uncertain contingency.
So in Re Lockyer 54 a declaratory order was not made as to the
(S.C., A.D.). See Stoddart v. Town of Owen Sound (1912), 8 D.L.R. 932 at
940-941 (Ont. H.C.); Re Lockyer (1934), 1 D.L.R. 687 at 689 (Ont. C.A.);
PrudentialTrust v. Keller (1958), 26 W.W.R. 664 at 666 (Sask. Q.B.); Charleston
v. MacGregor (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 78 (Alta. S.C.); Re Calford (1973), 37
D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. S.C., T.D.);Re Henning (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 762 (Alta.
S.C., A.D.). For Nova Scotia see D. Mullan, The DeclaratoryJudgment (1975), 2
Dalhousie L.J. 91 at 92.
50. (1958), 26 W.W.R. 664 (Sask. Q.B.)
51. (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 78 (Alta. S.C.)
52. (1956), 37 M.P.R. 341 at 361 (N.B.S.C.)
53. (1911), 19 W.L.R. 545 (Sask. S.C.), cited in Trottier v. NationalMfg. Co.
(1912), 8 D.L.R. 138 at 139 (Sask. S.C.); Charleston v. MacGregor (1958), 11
D.L.R. (2d) 78 at 85; Motor Car Supply Co. v. A.-G.for Alberta, [1938] 4 D.L.R.
489 at 501 (Alta. S.C., T.D.). The words "in the air" reflect a dictum of Jelf J. in
the English case ofA.-G. v. Scott (1904), 20 T.L.R. 630 at 633 (K.B.).
54. [1934] 1 D.L.R. 687 (Ont. C.A.)
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identity of beneficiaries when it appeared that the gift depended on
events which might never happen and that in certain circumstances
there might be nothing for the beneficiaries to take. Re Lockyer was
relied on in Fries v. Fries5 5 where a declaration relating to a wife's
right to dower was refused when this depended on a number of
uncertain events such as default, survivorship and the paying off of
mortgages. Again, in Dumny v. Yakimischak, 56 the Court, whilst
saying in general terms that a declaration should not be granted in
respect of future rights or hypothetical questions, refused to grant a
declaration as to rights which might be available at the conclusion of
a period of limitation on a lost cheque which still had some time to
run. The action was regarded as premature. Similarly, in Hoffman
v. McCloy, 57 the Court granted a declaration that the plaintiff was
entitled to certain royalties that might be received by the defendant
in the future but refused by a majority to couple this with an order
for a receiver and an account since it could be that no royalties
would in fact be earned.
Some of the Canadian cases, such as Dumny v. Yakimischak and
Hoffman v. McCloy, contain statements to the effect that
declarations will only be granted in respect of present and not of
future rights. This may appear at first sight to depart from the
English cases where a distinction is drawn between future rights,
that is to say the necessary consequences of present rights, in
respect of which declaratory relief is available, and hypothetical or
contingent rights, the coming into existence of which depends on
some future uncertain event and in respect of which declaratory
relief is not available. 58 On inspection, however, it seems that the
apparent conflict is merely a difference of terminology and those
"future rights" in respect of which declarations have been refused
55. [1949] 3 D.L.R. 849 (Ont. H.C.), rev'd. on other grounds [1949] 4 D.L.R.
784 (Ont. C.A.).
56. (1954), 12 W.W.R. 635 (Man. Q.B.)
57. (1917), 38 O.L.R. 446; 33 D.L.R. 526 (A.D.)
58. See supra, note 18. Leading English cases in this field - Curtis v. Sheffield
(1882), 21 Ch.D. I (C.A.);A.-G. v. Scott (1904), 20 T.L.R. 630 (K.B.) andIn Re
Steples, [1916] 1 Ch. 322 - were cited without fundamental criticism in Re
Lockyer. See also Stoddart v. Town of Owen Sound (1912), 8 D.L.R. 932 (Ont.
H.C.) where a declaration was granted that a by-law submission was invalid and
hence did not constitute an obstacle to the making of another submission at the end
of a period fixed by statute. Here the future right was certain to come into existence
at a fixed future time and was not dependent on any contingency or uncertainty. A
recent case is Re Calford (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 300 holding that a case relating to
the renewal terms of an existent lease was not premature.
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in the Canadian cases correspond to "hypothetical" or "contingent" rights in the English terminology. In such cases the action is
premature. Thus in all these respects a close affinity between the
Canadian and English approaches to the problem of the unreal
dispute seems apparent.
XI. Conclusions
A number of the principal policy considerations which underly the
unwillingness of courts at the present day to entertain unreal
disputes have already been mentioned. 59 These include the risk that
cases might not be adequately argued and the danger that fictitious
cases might be advanced in order to distort the development of the
law.
It is clear, however, that courts have not always taken this stand.
In early Tudor times the courts showed no lack of readiness to deal
with questions which would nowadays be regarded as theoretical or
unreal.6 0 A change of attitude seems to have appeared in the
seventeenth century when the early Stuart monarchs endeavoured to
forward their policies by taking advisory or consultative opinions
from the courts on questions which had not come into actual
dispute. 6 1 Suspicions engendered by these proceedings became
deeply ingrained in the legal profession and are reflected in the
62
fierce attack launched by Lord Hewart C.J. in The New Despotism
on a proposal to establish such a procedure in a Rating and
Valuation Bill of 1928.
It is possible, however, to point to a number of exceptional cases
where courts have been required to entertain cases which technically
are theoretical or academic. A well known example is the duty laid
on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to give rulings on
special references at the instance of the Crown. 6 3 Such references
59. Supra, note 24
60. L. W. Abbott, Law Reporting in England 1485-1585 (U. of London: Athlone
Press, 1973) at 184-85
61. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 44-48 and authorities cited there. It is interesting that in
the anonymous case from March's Reports (1641) 155-56 cited by Abbott, supra,
note 60 at 184, n. 206, the objection to answering an academic question was put on
the ground of res judicata. Serjeant Pheasant asked for advice from the Court in
accordance with old-established practice. "But the whole Court was against him
that they cannot be judges and counsellors, and that they ought not to advise any
man, for by that means they should prevent their judgment."
62. The New Despotism (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929) at 112-42
63. Judicial Committee Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, s.4. For Canada seeA. G.
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have been made to clarify the law in cases where the original dispute
has ceased to exist. 64 Again in England patent legislation now
provides for courts to determine the type of question which in North
Eastern Marine v. Leeds Forge was regarded as unreal on general
principle. 6 5
More recently the Criminal Justice Act 1972 provides for the
reference to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney-General of a point
of law following acquittal on indictment. 66 The Court of Appeal
may of its own motion or on application refer the matter to the
House of Lords.
In the cases in more recent years it has been seen that Sellers J. in
Webster v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, whilst holding
the dispute to be unreal expressed sympathy for the difficulties of
the prospective taxpayer and the same judge in Wood Components
of London v. Webster, the Court of Appeal in Stott v. West
Yorkshire Car Co. and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Hanoman v. Rose showed no disposition to extend the range of
cases which are to be regarded as unreal, theoretical or academic.
It has also been seen that it is not absolutely certain whether the
English courts refuse to entertain unreal disputes because of lack of
jurisdiction or in the exercise of their discretion 67 and these
considerations may tell in favour of treating the matter as a question
for the very cautious exercise of discretion rather than for total
prohibition. The distinction between the real and the unreal may on
occasion depend on technical subtleties6 8 or on the tactics of one of
the parties. Such obstructions to justice might perhaps be overcome
if the courts were to make it plain that they were prepared to operate
a discretionary power in such cases. 6 9
for Ontario &A.-G.for Canada, [1912] A.C. 571; [1912] 3 D.L.R. 509 (P.C.)
(Can.) for similar Canadian legislation. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 47, n. 66 mentions
that such legislation is also to be found in several American jurisdictions and in
France.
64. In re PiracyJureGentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.) (Special Reference)
65. Zamir, supra, note 8 at 211, n. 18, citing Patents Act 1949 and Registered
Designs Act 1949.
66. Criminal Justice Act 1973, c. 71, s. 36 (U.K.). The former accused takes no
part in these proceedings and his acquittal cannot be reversed so that the dispute is,
in principle, unreal.
67. Supra, note 14
68. There were strong dissenting judgments in Hoffnan v. McCloy (1917), 33
D.L.R. 526 at 531 by Meredith C.J.C.P. and in Re Lockyer, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 687
at 690 by Middleton J.A.
69. Forjudicial discretion as a solution for other problems in declaratory relief see
Mullan, supra, note 49 at 107-108.
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This has, in fact, been done in some of the Canadian authorities.
Thus in Vic RestaurantInc. v. City of Montreal7 0 the dispute related
to a licence for a year which had expired and hence could
technically be regarded as unreal. The Supreme Court of Canada,
however, pointed out that the question was one of great importance
for municipal institutions throughout Canada and, treating the
reality of the dispute as going to discretion rather than jurisdiction,
heard the case. Locke J. explicitly said:
The question of reality is not one in my opinion which goes to the
and one
jurisdiction of the court, rather it is a matter of discretion
71
to be decided in each case on the facts disclosed.
This case was relied on in Re Henning and City of Calgary.72 The
facts were that the City passed a taxing by-law which was at first
instance quashed for illegality in proceedings brought by the
respondent. The City then passed a second taxing by-law which
impliedly repealed the first and did not contain its controversial
feature, discrimination between different classes of property. The
City did, however, continue an appeal against the quashing of the
first by-law and the respondent objected that this appeal was now
academic. The judgment of the Court was delivered by McDermid
J.A. After reviewing Canadian, English and Scots authorities 73 and
citing the works of Dr. Zamir 74 and Professor de Smith, 7 5 he
concluded that the Court might hear the appeal. He distinguished
the present case from Attorney-General (Alberta) v.
Attorney-General (Canada)7 6 where litigation on repealed legisla70. [1959]S.C.R. 58; 17 D.L.R. (2d) 81

71. Id. at 89-90; 17 D.L.R. (2d) at 96; Cartwright J. was of the same opinion at 92;
17 D.L.R. (2d) at 99.
72. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 762 (Alta. S.C., T.D.)

73. Id. at 764-66 The cases reviewed were: Vic Restaurant Inc. v. City of
Montreal, [1959] S.C.R. 58; 17 D.L.R. (2d) 81; Kent Coal Co. v. Northwestern
UtilitiesLtd., [1936] 4 D.L.R. 337 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); Mathews v. Coca-Cola Co.
of Canada, [1944] 2 D.L.R. 355 (Ont. C.A.); Oatway v. CanadianWheat Board,
[1945] 2 D.L.R. 145 (S.C.C.); InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers v.
Winnipeg Builders (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 242 (S.C.C.); A.-G. Alberta v. A.-G.
Canada, [1939] A.C. 117; [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.) (Can.); Hanson v.
Radcliffe UDC, [1922] 2 Ch. 490 (C.A.); Barnard v. National Dock Labour
Board, [1953] 2 Q.B. 18 (C.A.); Russian Commercial IndustrialBank v. British
Bank, [1921] 2 A.C. 438 (H.L.); Chaplin's Trustees v. Hoile (1890), 18 R. 27
74. Supra, note 8
75. Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2d ed. London: Stevens, 1968) at
524-25. Eastham is there cited but this case may be more restricted in its effect than
is suggested. See supra, note 23
76. [1939] A.C. 117; [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.) (Can.)
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tion had been held to be academic on the ground that in the earlier
case there had been no intention to re-enact the repealed legislation.
Here the City wished to retain the impugned by-law and had only
repealed it by implication because if they had not passed the second
by-law they would have been without a taxing by-law. The question
was therefore "in substance a real one". 77 The City had a real
interest in raising it and the respondent, as he represented a
substantial group of landlords, had a real interest in opposing it. The
concurrence of these three factors gave good grounds for exercising
a discretion in favour of hearing the appeal. 78 McDermid J.A.
concluded by saying that the courts had always been anxious that if
they handled actions for declarations too liberally they would be
inundated with such actions. If that proved to be the case the court
might have to reconsider whether it should exercise its discretion in
favour of hearing such appeals.
Re Henning is one of the latest of a number of cases in which the
Canadian courts seem to have been rather more venturesome than
their English counterparts 79 in entertaining cases which are in
strictness unreal, theoretical or academic. It now remains to be seen
whether the possibility of being overwhelmed with such actions
alluded to by McDermid J.A. does eventuate and result in that
revision of the courts' exercise of their discretion which he foresaw
as its consequence.
77. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 762 at 767 The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in Hanoman v. Rose, [1955] A.C. 154 (P.C.) (British Guiana) were
prepared to entertain a dispute which was in substance real even though in matter of
form hypothetical or unreal.
78. These three grounds were taken from Lord Dunedin's statement of the practice
of Scottish courts in Russian Commercial Industrial Bank v. British Bank for
ForeignTrade, [1921] 2 A.C. 438 at448 (H.L.).
79. Supra, notes 14, 23. See also Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corp.,
[1958] Ch. 574 andBaringv. ICI PensionFund (1974), 119 S.J. 48

